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| 1 | ındian const**utional law and philosophy |
| 2 | Guest post: on the (un)const**utionlity of the compet**ion commission – aresponse |
| 3 | Guest post: on the (un)const**utionality of compet**ion commission –ıı |
| 4 | Guest post: on the (un)const**utionality of compet**ion commission –ı |
| 5 | “fake news” and theconst**ution |
| 6 | Guest post: silence and ‘pragmatism:’ skirting bail conditions in theuapa |
| 7 | Guest post: the andhra pradesh ordinances case – towards substantive judicialreview |
| 8 | Coronavirus and the const**ution x***ıı: payment of wages and judicial evasion in apandemic |
| 9 | Coronavirus and the const**ution – x***ı: the payment of wagesorder |
| 10 | Coronavirus and the const**ution – x***: pm-cares fund and the right to ınformation act [guestpost] |
| 11 | Guest post: slum rehabilitation and const**utional rights – a bewitchingdream |
| 12 | Follow blog via email |
| 13 | Authors |
| 14 | Recent posts |
| 15 | Books/publishers |
| 16 | ındian law blogs |
| 17 | ındian politics |
| 18 | ınternational blogs |
| 19 | Miscellany |
| 20 | Other websites |
| 21 | Archives |
| 22 | Tags |
| No | Text |
| 1 | Law on const**utionality of ordinances: a formal limited review |
| 2 | A more searching review: prof sbubhankar dam’s proposal for substantive review |
| 3 | The andhra pradesh ordinance case: a prototype for substantive review |
| 4 | Substantive review: transplanting miller’s effect test into ındia |
| No | Text |
| 1 | 21 |
| 2 | ≈ Leave a comment (10) |
| 3 | Tags (10) |
| 4 | Rajat Maloo |
| 5 | The CCI is not a Judicial Body |
| 6 | dispute |
| 7 | Limited Judicial Nature |
| 8 | 19 |
| 9 | Rahul (2) |
| 10 | Dev. (2) |
| 11 | Examination of Nature of Decision under Section 27 |
| 12 | Examination of Nature of Decision under Section 28 |
| 13 | Examination of Nature of Decision under Section 31 |
| 14 | 18 |
| 15 | Examination of CCI’s Const**utional Validity by the Delhi High Court |
| 16 | Whether the CCI is a part of the judiciary? In other words, can the CCI be considered a judicial body? |
| 17 | or |
| 18 | and |
| 19 | 76. |
| 20 | Characterizing the proceeding before CCI as one akin to the preliminary stages of a departmental proceeding |
| 21 | the court, in SAIL (supra), held that prima facie opinion formation was merely an administrative function |
| 22 | 77. |
| 23 | the initial steps it takes are not always towards, or in aid of adjudication. They are to ascertain fuller details and inquire into the veracity (or perhaps) seriousness of the contents of the information |
| 24 | If the recommendation of the DG is that no case exists, the CCI is nevertheless obliged to forward a report to the informant/complainant, receive its or his comments and afford a hearing [Section 26 (5)]. |
| 25 | After the hearing, it may dismiss the complaint [Section 26 (6)] |
| 26 | These investigative powers are also conferred concurrently upon the DG [Section 41 (2)] |
| 27 | . |
| 28 | 17 |
| 29 | without |
| 30 | 15 |
| 31 | Nitika Khaitan |
| 32 | 14 |
| 33 | Amlan Mishra |
| 34 | (b) |
| 35 | (a) |
| 36 | 12 |
| 37 | paragraph 29 |
| 38 | 10 |
| 39 | 06 |
| 40 | Shloka Shah |
| 41 | PM CARES |
| 42 | RTI/Act |
| 43 | SC |
| 44 | Meaning of ‘Public Authority’ |
| 45 | authority |
| 46 | body |
| 47 | inst**ution of self-government |
| 48 | owned, controlled or substantially financed |
| 49 | PMNRF |
| 50 | We have no doubt in our mind that the bodies and NGOs mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) in the second part of the definition are in addition to the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). |
| 51 | By adding an inclusive clause in the definition, Parliament intended to add two more categories, the first being in sub-clause (i), which relates to bodies which are owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government |
| 52 | Any body which is owned, controlled or substantially financed by the Government, would be a public authority. |
| 53 | paragraph 35 |
| 54 | must be a control of a substantial nature. |
| 55 | , the control of the body is of such a degree which amounts to substantial control over the management and affairs of the body |
| 56 | paragraph 44, 45 |
| 57 | MCA |
| 58 | ‘social projects’ |
| 59 | fund set up by the Central Government |
| 60 | CAG |
| 61 | It is PMNRF is headed by Const**utional Authority, i.e. the Prime Minister of India |
| 62 | . Furthermore, all disburs*****ts from PMNRF are made solely on the discretion of the Prime Minister. He or she is a public authority and decisions taken by him or her with respect to operation of PMNRF cannot be said to be made in a personal capacity. The decisions of the Prime Minister in this regard must be taken to be official decisions. |
| 63 | However, the use of those funds are not for a personal purpose; rather it is always for some public purpose. |
| 64 | CPIO |
| 65 | Available Exemptions |
| 66 | The term “fiduciary relations***p” is used to describe a situation or transaction where one person (beneficiary) places complete confidence in another person (fiduciary) in regard to his affairs, business or transaction(s). |
| 67 | third party: |
| 68 | para 44 |
| 69 | (1) No conflict rule; (2) No profit rule; (3) Undivided loyalty rule; and (iv) Duty of confidentiality, |
| 70 | whether giving information to the general public would be detrimental to the economic interests of the country? To what extent the public should be allowed to get information? |
| 71 | para 65 |
| 72 | . Furthermore, the relations***p between PMNRF and the donors/beneficiaries does not take colour of a ‘fiduciary relations***p’ as described above. The donors do not repose trust in PMNRF in conducting their business and the same holds true for the beneficiaries. |
| 73 | Consequently, the defence of exemption sought by the Appellant under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act is not sustainable. |
| 74 | para 35 |
| 75 | Conclusion (2) |
| 76 | 05 |
| 77 | Vaibhav Charalwar |
| 78 | Slum Act |
| 79 | Slum Rehabilitation Act and the Development Control Regulation – General Scheme |
| 80 | Rights of Slum Dwellers |
| 81 | right of residence |
| 82 | Issuance of Photo-pa***es |
| 83 | 51% consent |
| 84 | : (2) |
| 85 | Tests of Manifest Arbitrariness |
| 86 | Vasudev Devadasan |
| 87 | Gautam Bhatia |
| 88 | Mihir Naniwadekar |
| No | Text |
| 1 | Sunday (2) |
| 2 | first |
| 3 | second |
| 4 | Rojer Mathew |
| 5 | Cooper v. Wilson (2) |
| 6 | suo motu |
| 7 | prima facie (24) |
| 8 | Cooper Test |
| 9 | CCI v SAIL (2) |
| 10 | shall |
| 11 | Friday (3) |
| 12 | in rem |
| 13 | (1937)2 K.B. 307 |
| 14 | Union of India v. R. Gandhi |
| 15 | Madras Bar a***ociation v. Union of India |
| 16 | Thursday |
| 17 | Brahm Dutt v. Union of India |
| 18 | inter alia (3) |
| 19 | Mahindra Electric Mobility Limited and Anr. vs. Compet**ion Commission of India and Anr. |
| 20 | . (3) |
| 21 | Is the CCI a tribunal exercising judicial functions, or is it performing administrative and investigative functions and also adjudicating issues before it? |
| 22 | The first part |
| 23 | the second part |
| 24 | First possibility |
| 25 | Second Possibility |
| 26 | Compet**ion Commission of India vs. Steel Authority of India and Anr |
| 27 | Steel Authority of India Limited (supra) (3) |
| 28 | Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) |
| 29 | Excel Crop Care India v. Compet**ion Commission of India |
| 30 | Wednesday (2) |
| 31 | Any fake news or any news inciting hatred or disturbing communal harmony shall be proceeded against under IPC/Cyber Laws |
| 32 | some forms |
| 33 | category of speech |
| 34 | Protected Speech and its Limits |
| 35 | consequences |
| 36 | content |
| 37 | value judgements |
| 38 | believes |
| 39 | specific |
| 40 | Defining “Fake News” |
| 41 | thinking |
| 42 | used to use |
| 43 | The Argument for Regulating “Fake News” |
| 44 | ideas and counter-ideas, not facts and “counter-facts” |
| 45 | favour |
| 46 | Legally Restricting “Fake News” |
| 47 | Alvarez (2) |
| 48 | other speech |
| 49 | Shreya Singhal (2) |
| 50 | grossly offensive |
| 51 | all |
| 52 | Section 66-A purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right contained in Article 19(1)(a) in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of const**utionally permissible legislative action |
| 53 | It must therefore, be held to be wholly unconst**utional and void |
| 54 | and |
| 55 | Rajagopal |
| 56 | The Government and the Truth |
| 57 | does (2) |
| 58 | Conclusion |
| 59 | impossible |
| 60 | Monday |
| 61 | Shaheen Welfare a***ociation v. Union |
| 62 | ) |
| 63 | Shaheen Welfare a***n. |
| 64 | Miller II |
| 65 | force and effect’ |
| 66 | Krishna Kumar II (2) |
| 67 | amounts to no satisfaction at all |
| 68 | may be warranted in a rare case. |
| 69 | formal or procedural review |
| 70 | Presidential legislation in India |
| 71 | , (3) |
| 72 | procedural review |
| 73 | Bommai case |
| 74 | rishna Kumar I |
| 75 | Hasnabha (4) |
| 76 | elected |
| 77 | nominated |
| 78 | Bommai (10) |
| 79 | relevant material |
| 80 | Second |
| 81 | furthering ruling party interest. |
| 82 | Hasnabhai (2) |
| 83 | Krishna Kumar |
| 84 | electoral reform |
| 85 | after |
| 86 | deferred local body elections |
| 87 | effect (6) |
| 88 | The issue arose only on issuance of notification on 15.03.2020, suspending the election notification and postponing the elections, and when the State Government remained unsuccessful before Hon’ble the Supreme Court in challenging the said notification. The SEC projected the unprecedented events and acts of the ruling party to the Central Government, which is controverted by other side. The statements of the Council of Ministers to sack Mr.A are on record. Thereafter, on the basis of two or three complaints, the entire action has been taken in the name of electoral reforms and promulgated the impugned Ordinance |
| 89 | In the manner the events took place, it indicates the desirability of the State Government to bring the Ordinance in the name of electoral reforms to remove the inc***bent SEC, Mr.A and the power so exercised by the Governor under Article 213 of the Const**ution cannot be said to be based on the satisfaction of the circ***stances exist which may render it necessary for him to take immediate action |
| 90 | In fact, the action has been taken merely on the desirability of the State Government, without there being any public interest or const**utional necessity warranting exercise of the power for promulgation of the impugned Ordinance. |
| 91 | substantive review |
| 92 | substantive |
| 93 | has the effect of frustrating or preventing |
| 94 | , without reasonable justification |
| 95 | , the ability of Parliament to carry out its const**utional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive |
| 96 | effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course |
| 97 | the effect to |
| 98 | democratic principles |
| 99 | reasonable justification |
| 100 | based |
| 101 | effects test |
| 102 | effect of frustrating a democracy |
| 103 | : |
| 104 | probable effect of such dissolution would be to frustrate state parliamentary action in a matter where the pa***age of intervening time would present it with a fait accompli…” |
| 105 | oblique |
| 106 | purpose |
| 107 | a limited review |
| 108 | Miller |
| 109 | reasonably justified |
| 110 | effect of frustrating |
| 111 | test |
| 112 | weigh |
| 113 | effect test |
| 114 | reasonable justification’ |
| 115 | but in the meantime |
| 116 | without |
| 117 | Ficus Pax Private Lts. v Union of India |
| 118 | specifically |
| 119 | had |
| 120 | 12th of June 2020 |
| 121 | pure question of law |
| 122 | skewed the case in favour of the employer |
| 123 | further seven weeks |
| 124 | still remains presumptively legal and valid |
| 125 | July |
| 126 | April |
| 127 | status quo (2) |
| 128 | was already struck by the government |
| 129 | employers and employees to negotiate with each other |
| 130 | reversed |
| 131 | laissez faire |
| 132 | would not have protected the interests of the latter |
| 133 | without even the courtesy of a reasoned judgment or a finding of illegality |
| 134 | via media |
| 135 | actively hold in favour of the stronger party |
| 136 | all the employers, be it in the Industry or in the shops and commercial establishments, shall make payment of wages of their workers, at their work places, on the due date, without any deduction, for the period their establishments are under closure during the lockdown |
| 137 | Ludhiana Hand Tools a***ociation v Union of India. |
| 138 | carte blanche; |
| 139 | power |
| 140 | necessarily |
| 141 | restrictions |
| 142 | mitigate |
| 143 | non-obstante (2) |
| 144 | exception |
| 145 | more beneficial |
| 146 | source |
| 147 | not |
| 148 | livelihood |
| 149 | disproportionately impacted |
| 150 | effaced |
| 151 | entirely |
| 152 | its |
| 153 | its own |
| 154 | Sat****ay |
| 155 | a. |
| 156 | b. |
| 157 | c. |
| 158 | d. |
| 159 | D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society v. Director of Public Instructions |
| 160 | inartistically worded |
| 161 | “a big gap” |
| 162 | first part |
| 163 | second part |
| 164 | i (5) |
| 165 | ii |
| 166 | a (2) |
| 167 | d (5) |
| 168 | Thalappam Service Co-op Bank Ltd. v State of Kerala |
| 169 | h (3) |
| 170 | fund set up by the Central Government for socio-economic development and relief’ |
| 171 | ‘social projects’ |
| 172 | ‘contribution to the PMNRF or any other fund set up by the Central Government or the State Governments for socio-economic development and relief’, |
| 173 | Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund v Aseem Takyar |
| 174 | ex-officio |
| 175 | ipso facto |
| 176 | personal capacity |
| 177 | not for a personal purpose; rather it is always for some public purpose. |
| 178 | Central Board of Secondary Education v Aditya Bandopadhyay |
| 179 | Reserve Bank of India v Jayantilal Mistry. |
| 180 | PMNRF (supra) |
| 181 | Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal |
| 182 | K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v Union of India. |
| 183 | of |
| 184 | Kamraj Basti |
| 185 | Olga Tellis |
| 186 | Eviction of pet**ioners will lead to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the deprivation of life |
| 187 | Tulsiwadi |
| 188 | Shyra Bano |
| No | Text |
| 1 | The CCI is not a Judicial Body |
| 2 | Limited Judicial Nature |
| 3 | fake news |
| 4 | Any restriction on speech must have a proximate connection with a specific head set out in Article 19(2) |
| 5 | Vagueness: |
| 6 | Overbreadth: |
| 7 | restrictions both within and without the limits of const**utionally permissible legislative action |
| 8 | broad censorial power to regulate falsehoods |
| 9 | one |
| 10 | the |
| 11 | some relevant material |
| 12 | authority |
| 13 | body |
| 14 | inst**ution of self-government |
| 15 | owned, controlled or substantially financed |
| 16 | We have no doubt in our mind that the bodies and NGOs mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) in the second part of the definition are in addition to the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). |
| 17 | By adding an inclusive clause in the definition, Parliament intended to add two more categories, the first being in sub-clause (i), which relates to bodies which are owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government |
| 18 | Any body which is owned, controlled or substantially financed by the Government, would be a public authority. |
| 19 | must be a control of a substantial nature. |
| 20 | , the control of the body is of such a degree which amounts to substantial control over the management and affairs of the body |
| 21 | ‘social projects’ |
| 22 | fund set up by the Central Government |
| 23 | It is PMNRF is headed by Const**utional Authority, i.e. the Prime Minister of India |
| 24 | . Furthermore, all disburs*****ts from PMNRF are made solely on the discretion of the Prime Minister. He or she is a public authority and decisions taken by him or her with respect to operation of PMNRF cannot be said to be made in a personal capacity. The decisions of the Prime Minister in this regard must be taken to be official decisions. |
| 25 | However, the use of those funds are not for a personal purpose; rather it is always for some public purpose. |
| 26 | The term “fiduciary relations***p” is used to describe a situation or transaction where one person (beneficiary) places complete confidence in another person (fiduciary) in regard to his affairs, business or transaction(s). |
| 27 | third party: |
| 28 | (1) No conflict rule; (2) No profit rule; (3) Undivided loyalty rule; and (iv) Duty of confidentiality, |
| 29 | whether giving information to the general public would be detrimental to the economic interests of the country? To what extent the public should be allowed to get information? |
| 30 | . Furthermore, the relations***p between PMNRF and the donors/beneficiaries does not take colour of a ‘fiduciary relations***p’ as described above. The donors do not repose trust in PMNRF in conducting their business and the same holds true for the beneficiaries. |
| 31 | Consequently, the defence of exemption sought by the Appellant under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act is not sustainable. |
| 32 | Slum Rehabilitation Act and the Development Control Regulation – General Scheme |
| 33 | Rights of Slum Dwellers |
| 34 | Issuance of Photo-pa***es |
| 35 | 51% consent |
| 36 | Tests of Manifest Arbitrariness |
| 37 | Conclusion |
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